We study the determinants of patent suits and their outcomes over the period by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent office, the federal court system, and industry sources. The probability of being involved in a suit is heterogeneous, being much higher for valuable patents and for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Thus the patent system generates incentives, net of expected enforcement costs, that differ across inventors. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or having other characteristics that encourage "cooperative" interaction with disputants, more successfully avoid court actions. At the same time, key post-suit outcomes do not depend on observed characteristics. This is good news: advantages in settlement are exercised quickly, before extensive legal proceedings consume both court and firm resources. But it is bad news in that the more frequent involvement of smaller patentees in court actions is not offset by a more rapid resolution of their suits. However, our estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can facilitate development of private patent litigation to mitigate this adverse effect of high enforcement costs.
Introduction
Patent litigation grew rapidly during the period 1978-1999. The number of patent suits rose by almost tenfold, with much of this increase occurring during the 1990's. This has raised fears among scholars and the business community that \patent thickets" are beginning to impede the ability of¯rms to conduct R&D activity e®ectively (Eisenberg, 1999; Shapiro, 2001 ). But focusing on the level of litigation is misleading. We show that the the growth in patenting has been comparable to the growth in litigation, with the consequence that¯ling rates for suits have been roughly constant over these two decades. The average rate is relatively low, 19.0 suits per thousand patents. But this too is misleading, because exposure to litigation varies widely across technology¯elds and patent pro¯les. Average suit rates vary from a low of 11.8 per thousand chemical patents to [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] per thousand computer, biotechnology and non-drug health patents. Moreover, within any given technology¯eld, probabilities of litigation di®er very substantially, and are systematically related to patent characteristics associated with their economic value and to characteristics of their owners.
This heterogeneity of patents, and their owners, is a central issue for the enforcement of intellectual property rights and its economic consequences. Lerner (1995) , for example, provides evidence that small¯rms avoid R&D areas where the threat of litigation from larger¯rms is high. Lanjouw and Lerner (2002) argue that the use of preliminary injunctions by large¯rms can discourage R&D by small¯rms, and this may apply to other legal mechanisms. Even if parties can settle their patent disputes without resorting to suits, the e®ective threat of litigation will in°uence settlement terms and thus, ultimately, the incentives to undertake R&D. The essence of the process of enforcing patent rights is sorting, or selection, among patent disputes. In theoretical models of litigation (P'ng, 1983; Bebchuk, 1984; Priest and Klein, 1984; Spier, 1992) , this sorting can occur at each stage of the legal process, beginning with the decision tō le a suit and ending either with post-suit settlement or adjudication at trial. Using a comprehensive new data set covering all recorded patent litigation in the U.S. over the period 1978-1999, we analyse the determinants of this sorting process.
One of our key empirical¯ndings is that virtually all of the sorting on observed characteristics of both patents and their owners occurs in the decision to¯le suits. The key post-suit outcomes { the probability of settlement and the plainti® win rates at trial { are almost completely independent of these characteristics. The threat of court action (suits) is the primary mechanism through which sorting occurs, and this helps to mitigate the private (and social) costs of enforcement. This conclusion is reinforced by two additional¯ndings:¯rst, post-suit settlement rates are high (about 95 percent) and, second, most settlement occurs soon after the suit is¯led, often before the pre-trial hearing is held.
There are two main mechanisms by which patentees can settle disputes without resorting to litigation. The¯rst is by \trading" intellectual property. This take various forms, including cross-licensing agreements and patent exchanges, sometimes with balancing cash payments (Grindley and Teece, 1997) . One motivation for accumulating patents may be to facilitate such trading (Hall and Zeidonis, 2001 ). The second mechanism that promotes settlement of disputes is the expectation of repeated interaction among patentees. The theory of supergames, especially under incomplete information, suggests that repeated interaction increases both the ability (players learn about each other's unobserved type) and the incentive to settle disputes \cooperatively"{ i.e., without¯ling suits (see, for example, Bernheim and Whinston, 1990 ). But there is very little econometric evidence to support this prediction.
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The importance of trading and repeated interaction as mechanisms for patent dispute resolution is supported by three key¯ndings in this paper. First, we¯nd strong evidence of a patent portfolio e®ect in enforcing patent rights: having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of¯ling a suit on any individual patent, conditional on its observed characteristics. And the quantitative e®ect is large. For a (small) domestic unlisted company with a small portfolio of 100 patents, the average probability of litigating a given patent is two percent. For a similar company but with a moderate portfolio of 500 patents, the¯gure drops to only 0.5 percent. This portfolio e®ect means that there are bene¯cial \enforcement spillovers" across patents within a given¯rm, conferring advantages to size in the ability of¯rms to appropriate returns from their intellectual property. Second, we¯nd that the (marginal) e®ect of patent portfolio size is stronger for smaller companies, as measured by employment. For small¯rms, having a portfolio of patents to \trade" is likely to be the key mechanism for avoiding litigation, whereas larger¯rms can also rely on repeated interaction in intellectual property and product markets to discipline behaviour. Third,¯rms which operate in technology areas that are more concentrated (where patenting is dominated by fewer companies) are much less likely to be involved in patent infringement suits. In short, what is important for settlement is that¯rms either have a portfolio of intellectual property to trade, or have other dimensions of interaction that promote \cooperative" behavior. In addition to the ability to trade patents and repeated play, we¯nd that asymmetry of¯rm size a®ects litigation risk. Patent owners who are large relative to disputants they are likely to encounter less frequently resort to the courts to settle disputes.
We also show the characteristics of a given patent strongly a®ect litigation risk in ways that are consistent with existing hypotheses in the economics literature (as in Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001 ). We illustrate this with two example. First, more valuable patents, as measured by the number of claims and citations per claim, are much more likely to be involved in suits. Second, patents that are related to subsequent technological activity by the¯rm (cumulative innovation), as measured by the extent of self-citation in patents, are more likely to be litigated. This supports the idea that complementarity among inventions increases the willingness to protect the property rights, especially the key (early) innovations in the chain (Scotchmer, 1991) . We show that di®erences in these, and other, patent characteristics lead to wide variations in the probability of litigation, within any given technology¯eld.
Both the advantages of patent portfolio and company size in settling disputes, and the heterogeneity of litigation risk across patents, point to the potential importance of developing market-based provision of patent litigation insurance. This may be essential for strengthening the ability of small¯rms to enforce their intellectual property rights, and their bargaining power in negotiated settlements. There are a number of providers of litigation insurance in the U.S. and other countries. But the e®ective demand has been severely limited by high prices while, at the same time, pro¯tability for suppliers is undermined by the widespread use of pooled prices. Some of these concerns have recently been voiced in government and the public media. 3 The results in this paper can be used to develop insurance pricing schemes that recognise the (observed) heterogeneity of litigation risk. From the perspective of small¯rms, this is a double-edged sword. By facilitating economically rational price di®erentiation, such information may make it easier to establish sustainable insurance markets. On the other hand, the advantages to portfolio and company size in reducing litigation risk suggest that the appropriate prices for smaller¯rms should be higher than for large¯rms, for any given patent pro¯le. But both small and large¯rms have patents of many pro¯les, and di®erentiating pricing across patent characteristics is likely to be bene¯cial to both types of¯rms.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the analytical framework, including the litigation stages and outcomes we analyse. Section 3 describes the construction of the data set, summarises the main characteristics of patents and their owners on which we focus, and discusses how they relate to economic hypotheses about the determinants of litigation. Section 4 presents and discusses non-parametric evidence on the relationship between these characteristics and the¯ling of suits and their outcomes.
Section 5 presents econometric analysis of the determinants of litigation for infringement and invalidity suits, and of post-suit settlement. Concluding remarks summarise directions for future research.
Analytical Framework
For analytical purposes, we break down the litigation process into four stages: 1.¯ling the suit, 2. the pre-trial hearing, 3. commencement of the trial, and 4. adjudication at the conclusion of trial. According to our discussions with patent lawyers, legal costs are more closely related to how many stages the case reaches than to the actual length of the case, which is strongly a®ected by the availability of court resources and other external factors.
There are three possible outcomes to a suit: 1. settlement, 2. win for the plainti®, or 3. win for the defendant (the identity of the patentee depends on whether it is an infringement or invalidity suit). 4 If a patent dispute is settled before a suit is¯led, we do not observe the dispute in the data. Thus low¯ling rates can either re°ect low rates infringement (disputes) or high probability of pre-suit settlement. After a suit is¯led, settlement can occur before the pre-trial hearing, after the hearing but before the trial begins, or during the trial. Otherwise, the trial concludes with a court judgement in favour of one of the parties. 5 .
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) analysed the determinants of the probability of litigation (case¯lings). For this paper we have constructed a larger data set that allows us to study both case¯lings and post-suit outcomes. In particular, we analyse:
1. the probability of a suit being¯led 2. the probability of settlement, conditional on a suit being¯led 3. the timing of settlement: i.e., the conditional probability that the suit is resolved before the pre-trial hearing or after.
4. the planti® win rates, conditional on adjudication at trial.
Information on win rates is relevant for assessing overall litigation risk (e.g., in pricing patent insurance). Such information is also useful in testing competing economic models of litigation because the models generate di®erent predictions about plainti® win rates at trial (Walfogel, 1998; Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999) . There are two main models: divergent expectations (Priest and Klein, 1984) and asymmetric information (Bebchuk, 1984) . In the divergent expectations model, each party estimates the quality of his case (equivalently, the relevant legal standard) with error, and cases go to trial when the plainti® is su±ciently more optimistic than the defendant. This is most likely to occur when true case quality is near the court's decision standard. This selection mechanism drives the plainti® win rate at trial toward 50 percent. 6 In the asymmetric information model, one party knows the probability that the plainti® will win at trial, while the other party knows only the distribution of plainti® win rates. The uniformed party makes a settlement o®er (or a sequence of o®ers, in dynamic versions of the modelSpier 1992) and it will be accepted only by informed defendants who face a relatively low probability of winning at trial. Trials can arise in equilibrium because settlement o®ers have some probability of failing when one of the parties has private information. Because of this one-sided selection mechanism, the asymmetric information model predicts that the win rate for the party with private information should tend toward 100 percent. As we discuss in Section 4, the empirical evidence for patent litigation strongly favors the divergent expectations model.
Litigation models explain why cases reaching trial are a selected sample of¯led cases. Similar selection will be at work on¯led cases, to the extent that potential plainti®s may not¯le suits on certain types of patents (or defendants may settle prior to suit). Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) show that observed characteristics of patents and their owners strongly a®ect the probability of¯ling a suit. We con¯rm, and extend, those¯ndings in this paper. At the same time, we¯nd that post-suit outcomes { e.g., whether parties settle, or who wins if the case reaches trial { are unrelated to these same characteristics.
Description of Data
The data source used to identify litigated patents is the LitAlert database produced We also obtained information on all U.S. patent-related cases (those coded 830) from the court database organised by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). This information runs through the end of 1997 and includes the progress or resolution of suits { e.g., whether the case is settled and at which stage of the proceedings this occurs, whether the case proceeds to trial, and the outcome of the trial. 7 The form of docket numbering was made (by hand) consistent across the two data sets, so they could be merged.
To create a control group, we generated a \matched" set of patents from the population of all U.S. patents (both litigated and unlitigated) from the PTO. For each litigated patent, a patent was chosen at random from the set of all U.S. patents with the same application year and primary 3-digit U.S. Patent Classi¯cation (USPC) class assignment. By constructing the population sample in this way, the comparisons we 7 Discussions with the Federal Judicial Center indicated the data probably do not cover all cases involving patents, as some may be coded under other categories by the court (e.g., the patent issue may be part of a broader contractual dispute). This is also evident in the data where a small percentage of cases identi¯ed in Derwent are not in the FJC database (see Somaya, 2001 , for a breakdown between typos and coding di®erences). But there is no reason to expect any selection bias from the perspective of the issues we analyse. present between litigated patents and matched patents largely control for technology and cohort e®ects. The control is not perfect, however, because we have 12,771 matched patents. This is bigger than the number of litigated patents for two reasons. First, the more recent part of our sample includes matches for both main and other patents in each suit, whereas we only use the main litigated patents in the analysis. Second, in combining our old (1978-91) and new (1990-99) data, we dropped duplicate cases in the overlapping years when counting litigated patents. We do not have identi¯ers in either round of subsetting the litigated data that would allow us to easily delete the corresponding matched patents. We do not expect this to create any systematic bias.
Although the U.S. Federal courts are required to report to the PTO every casē ling that involves a U.S. patent, under-reporting occurs in practice. Thus the PTO (and Derwent) data is a subset of all patent cases. To estimate the reporting rates, we take the number of cases¯led according to Derwent divided by the number in the same year that are coded as a patent case by the Federal Judicial Center. We can compute the reporting rates through 1998 (we use the last value for 1999). They stabilise in the 1990's at about 55 percent (see Appendix 1). We found no evidence of selection bias in the underreporting by the courts to the PTO: there are no signi¯cant di®erences between reported and unreported cases for a range of variables in the federal database.
A truncation issue arises because we observe suit¯lings only through 1999, so later cohorts of patents look like they are less litigated by construction. We use the lag structure for case¯lings for cohorts 1982-86 to adjust for this truncation. The estimates are based on the pooled sample, and are applied to each technology¯eld. The truncation rate for the 1992 cohort (i.e., lag of 7 years) is about 50 pecent, and it jumps sharply to 75 percent for the 1995 cohort. Appendix 1 presents the estimated truncation rates. The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in the application, but the patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed before granting.
Technology Field : Each patent is assigned by the patent examiner to 3-digit classes of the USPC system, of which there are 421 in total. The USPC is a heirarchical, technology-based classi¯cation system and patents may be assigned to more than one class. In the empirical analysis, we use the set of all 3-digit classes to which a patent was assigned. We use the categorisation developed by Adam Ja®e to aggregate these classes to a 2-digit level (used for some purposes explained later) and then to the eight broad technology groups used in most of the paper: Drugs, Other Health, Chemical, Electronics (excl. computers), Mechanical, Computers, Biotechnology, and Miscellaneous.
Assignments to biotechnology are based on the categorisation used by the PTO when determining who examines a patent. The technology¯eld composition of cases is given in Table 1 .
Citations: An inventor must cite all related prior U.S. patents in the patent application. A patent examiner who is an expert in the¯eld is responsible for insuring that all appropriate patents have been cited. Like claims, the citations in the patent document help to de¯ne the property rights of the patentee. For each patent in the litigated and matched data, we obtained the number of prior patents cited in the application (backward citations) and their USPC sub-class assignments. We obtained the same information on all subsequent patents which had cited a given patent in their own applications, as of 1998 (forward citations). For recent patents there is substantial truncation in the number of forward citations, since citation lags can be long (Ja®e and Trajtenberg, 1999) . To minimise truncation bias, we limit parts of the analysis to cohorts before 1993. For older patents there is considerable missing information on the USPC sub-class assignments of backward citations, as comprehensive data are only available from about 1970, but the number of backward citations is complete for all patents.
Ownership: We identify each patent owner as an individual, an unlisted company, or a listed company. In most of the analysis we treat those suits where the patentee is not one of the litigants as an infringement suit, since they are likely to be suits brought either by an exclusive licensee or by a subsidiary or head o±ce of the patent-owning entity.
Patent Portfolio Size: Each company that is assigned a patent by the inventor is given a company code by the PTO. This allows us to construct a measure of the size of an owner's patent portfolio, as it looks around the application date of each of our sample patents. The relevant portfolio variable (portsize) is de¯ned as the number of patents owned by a company that have an application date within ten years in either direction of the patent in question. Notice that this portfolio size variable may di®er across patents, for a given company. As expected, domestic listed companies tend to have larger portfolios { roughly a third of patents owned by domestic listed companies are in portfolios in each of size groups 1-100, 100-900 and >900 patents. By contrast, about 90 percent of patents owned by domestic unlisted companies, and two-thirds of patents owned by foreign companies, are in portfolios with fewer than 100 patents.
Technology Concentration: We construct a measure of¯rm concentration in the any listed company that is started after 1989 will not have a CUSIP in our data and thus will be coded as an unlisted company. For a patentee who is the plainti® (infringement suits), being relatively large confers greater threat power (e.g., holding cross-licensing of other patents hostage to this dispute) and this should facilitate settlement with the infringer. This is less clear-cut when the patentee is the defendant. A stronger defendant may be less willing to settle (or be able to extract more favorable settlement terms from the plainti®). Thus we expect the probability of litigation to decline with relative size in infringement suits, but the prediction for declaratory judgement suits is ambiguous.
Other Information: From Standard and Poors' information on listed companies, we downloaded¯nancial and other company information for the listed¯rms either owning patents involved in litigation or in our matched sample.
The preceding variables are designed to capture the main determinants of patent suits:
10 (i) the number of potential disputes -measured by the number of claims, the diversity of technology classes into which the patent falls, and the technological similarity of future patents that cite the original one; (ii) the size of the stakes -measured by the number of future citations the patent receives, and the extent of self-citation (as an indicator of the¯rm's cumulative investment in that technology); and (iii) the relative costs of settlement and prosecuting a suit -measured by patent portfolio size, technology concentration, relative size, and ownership type and nationality of the patentee.
Non-parametric Evidence
Although the number of patent infringement suits has risen by almost tenfold since 1978, the increase has not been uniform across technology¯elds { it was particularly high in While we observe little evidence of trends in¯ling rates, the level of¯ling rates may be understated by Table 2 . They are caculated using only the main patents in each suit, while there may in fact be several patents per suit. We present these calculations because,
for¯ling years before 1990, we only have information about the main patents (mixing the subsidiary patents for later years would distort litigation trends). The¯ling rates we compute are underestimates of the \true" rates if one views being a subsidiary patent in a case as equivalent to being the main litigated patent. To estimate the di®erence, one could scale up the¯ling rate by dividing by the ratio of subsidiary to main patents.
This ratio is 0.24 percent overall, but it varies across technology¯elds.
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It is important to look beyond average¯ling rates for given technology¯elds, because they conceal huge heterogeneity. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) showed that litigated patents have more claims and more forward citations per claim. Table   3 con¯rms this¯nding on the larger data set. The table presents the mean number of claims, and citations per claim, for litigated and matched patents, broken down by ownership type. Litigated patents have far more claims than matched patents, and this holds for each ownership type. They also have more forward citations per claim and fewer backward cites per claim (i.e., the latter is an indication that the technology area is well-developed and the innovation is more likely to be derivative and less valuable).
Both of these¯ndings indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be involved in litigation.
There are also large di®erences across di®erent types of patent owners. Table 4 summarizes the mean¯ling and settlement rates for four ownership categories: individuals, domestic unlisted and listed companies, and foreign companies. Domestic listed companies are far less likely to¯le suits on their patents than unlisted companies and reported).
individuals: their mean¯ling rate is 10.4 suits per thousand patents, as compared to 35-45 suits for the smaller owners. Moreover,¯ling rates for foreign patentees (mostly unlisted¯rms) are much lower than for their domestic counterparts. These di®erences in mean¯ling rates are statistically signi¯cant, and the joint null hypothesis that they are the same is decisively rejected (Â 2 (3) = 11; 853; p-value <.001).
Although¯ling rates di®er sharply across ownership types, we¯nd that ownership does not a®ect the probability that a suit is settled before it reaches the end of trial { which we call post-suit settlement. The formal
Overall, about 95 percent of all patent suits¯led are settled by the parties before the conclusion of trial (and most of those before the trial begins). But the systematic sorting on the ownership dimension occurs before suits are¯led, not afterwards.
One explanation for why listed and unlisted¯rms have such di®erent¯ling rates may be that the listed¯rms are typically larger and there may be advantages to size.
As discussed above, there are two distinct aspects to such advantages. First,¯rms with larger patent portfolios may be better able to settle disputes through trading intellectual property, without resorting to suits (the portfolio size e®ect). Second, if imperfect capital markets constrain the ability of smaller¯rms to¯nance litigation, relatively large¯rms may be better able to settle because they pose greater litigation threats when confronting smaller¯rms. And when large¯rms have disputes with each other, they are likely to have many points of interaction other than trading intellectual property, especially through competition in product markets. This expectation of repeated interaction in other dimensions should promote settlement. We call these latter two aspects¯rm size e®ects. The detailed patent data will enable us to discriminate between the portfolio size and each¯rm size e®ect on litigation.
We begin by examining how the probability of litigation (i.e., of being involved in at least one suit over the life of the patent) and the probability of post-suit settlement varies with di®erent portfolio sizes. To compute these probabilities, we adjust for the fact that patents from large portfolios are disproportionately represented in the matched data (since the matching was not strati¯ed by portfolio size { see Appendix 2 for details). Table 5 shows that the probability of litigation sharply declines with portfolio size. A formal test con¯rms this¯nding (Â 2 (6) = 2; 610; p-value <.001). The probability of ling a suit involving a patent in a portfolio with a small number of other patents (0-10) is 1.7 percent, compared to about 0.5 percent for a patent in a portfolio with 100-300 other patents, and only 0.25 percent for those in large portfolios (> 900 patents). These are large di®erences, and they show that having bigger portfolios confer substantial advantages in settling patent disputes without¯ling suits. But again, we observe only small di®erences in the post-suit settlement rates across portfolio size. The di®erences in point estimates are marginally statistically signi¯cant (Â 2 (6) = 14:2; p-value ¼0.05).
To distinguish between the advantages of portfolio size and¯rm size, we divide domestic listed¯rms into two groups { those with employment around 1989 above the median level of 5,463 (\large") and those below the median (\small").
14 Panel A in Table 6 presents the litigation probability broken down both by portfolio size and this measure of company size. First, we see a fall in litigation probability with portfolio size within each ownership type, at least in point estimate. However, it is by far more precipious for domestic unlisted companies. For a patent owned by such a company and in a portfolio of 0-10 other patents, the average probability of being involved in litigation is 2.6 percent, while for patents in the same sized portfolio but owned by listed domestic companies it is closer to one percent. At the same time, there is little evidence that size -either in terms of public listing or employment -matters once more than about 100 patents are held. For any given portfolio size, foreign companies are much less likely tō le suits than other types of¯rms. The relationship between probability of litigation and portfolio size holds in each of the technology¯elds (not reported).
Similar to the results in Table 2 , the probability of litigation di®ers substantially across technology areas, for any given ownership type. Here we also see, however, that the pattern of di®erences across¯elds depends on the type of owner (see Table 7 ).
One explanation for these di®erences in litigation probabilities is that¯rms with larger portfolios may have a higher propensity to patent their innovations, and thus more often have patents that are not worth¯ghting over. But the evidence contradicts this hypothesis. Portfolio size is positively, and signi¯cantly, correlated with forward citations and forward citations per claim { the correlation coe±cients are 0.10 and 0.06, respectively (these are computed using the matched sample and cohorts 1978-1988 to avoid spurious correlation due to both portfolio size and citations being truncated.) This indicates that the link between litigation probability and portfolio size does actually re°ect the advantages that large portfolios give to¯rms in settling disputes.
But this is only half the story. Panel B in Table 6 presents the average probability of settlement for di®erent portfolio sizes and ownership categories, conditional on a suit being¯led. Here we see that post-suit settlement rates do not vary signi¯cantly with portfolio size, or with ownership type controlling for portfolio size.
In short, the likelihood of¯ling a suit (i.e., of not settling beforehand) is much higher for patents owned by individuals and unlisted companies, and for patentees with smaller patent portfolios to trade. But these di®erences do not appear in post-suit settlement rates. Thus, almost all of the sorting among disputes, on the basis of observed characteristics of patents and patentees, occurs before suits are¯led, not afterwards in the courts.
To this point we have focused on the probability of litigation and of post-suit settlement. We now turn to the timing of such settlements and the win rates for cases that reach the trial adjudication stage. 
Econometric Analysis
In this section we present estimates of probit regressions on the determinants of the probability of infringement suits and post-suit settlement for the pooled data. These en- We use the Derwent data as the basis for the sample, since it contains the link to patent numbers, and then include only those cases that can also be linked into the FJC database which contains the outcomes information. This procedure yields 6,538 litigated main patents. In analysing the determinants of the litigation probability (¯ling of suits), we do not count multiple cases involving the same patent. We do this to avoid undue in°uence by a few patentees suing many infringers in separate but related cases.
We include multiple cases in the econometric analysis of the suit outcomes for three reasons: 1. this is appropriate if the purpose is to assess litigation risk for pricing patent insurance, 2. it is unclear how one would choose the \representative" suit when there are multiple cases, and 3. the sample size for outcomes (especially trials) is relatively small even when we include multiple cases.
Panel A in Table 9 summarises the parameter estimates and the sample marginal e®ect of each variable on the probability of litigation for a randomly drawn patent in the matched sample (i.e., at matched sample means). This is done separately for patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits. Since the sample litigation rate is close to 40 percent by construction, we must multiply the reported marginal e®ects by a conversion factor in order to obtain the marginal e®ects for a randomly drawn patent in the population (the conversion factors are given at the bottom of Table 9 ; see Appendix 3 for computational details). The statistical signi¯cance of variables and the relative size of their e®ects are preserved through this conversion, although magnitudes will depend on the speci¯c population of interest. We focus the discussion on the results for patent infringement cases. Since the pattern of results is similar for declaratory judgement suits (Panel B), we do not discuss them in detail.
The probability of litigation increases with the number of claims and forward citations per claim, at a declining rate, and the e®ects are substantial. Evaluated at population means (litigation probability of 1.35 percent), a ten percent increase in the number of claims (1.2 claims at the mean) implies an increase of 3.1 percent in the population probability of litigation. It is noteworthy that the point estimate of the elasticity of the litigation probability with respect to claims is considerably smaller than unity.
A unit elasticity is required to make it rational, on actuarial grounds, to price patent litigation insurance on a per claim basis, which is the standard procedure in policies currently available in the marketplace. We also¯nd that a 10 percent increase in the number of forward citations per claim raises the probability of an infringement suit by 1. We have also argued that forward self-citations to a patent (given its total number of forward citations) indicates the presence of \cumulative innovation" by the patentee.
That is, the patent owner is engaged in subsequent inventions that build on this earlier patent and that, as a result, he has a greater incentive to protect his property rights in this area. This hypothesis is supported by the positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on the variable FWDSELF, the percentage of citations which is self-citation. At the mean (FWDSELF=0.065), increasing the percentage of forward self-cites by 10 percent would raise the probability of an infringement suit by 0.4 percent (the estimate is proportionately higher for larger values of self-citing). At the same time, we¯nd that greater backward self-citation (BWDSELF) signi¯cantly reduces the likelihood of litigation, but the e®ect is again small at the mean: raising the percentage of backward self-cites by ten percent lowers the litigation probability by about 0.25 percent. Greater backward self-citation in a patent indicates that an invention builds more extensively on one's own past research and is thus more likely to be a \derivative" invention. This evidence sup-ports the idea that there is complementarity among technologically-related inventions in a¯rm's R&D portfolio, and that this raises the willingness to protect the property rights of the key, early inventions in the chain.
In our earlier work, we found that greater technological similarity of forward citations increased the probability of litigation. 16 The similarity measure was used as an index of whether the technology area was \crowded" and thus more likely to generate potential disputes. However, we do not¯nd any evidence of that link in the current, expanded data set. Lerner (1994) suggests that patents with uses in many technological areas { \broad" patents { are more likely to be litigated because they face more potential infringers. Using the number of technology class assignments as a measure of patent breadth, he con¯rmed the hypothesis on a sample of biotechnology patents. Using more comprehensive data for various technology¯elds, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) found that broader patents are less likely to be involved in suits, but the evidence was weak. We test this hypothesis on our expanded and more recent data set, using the number of
3-digit USPC classes as the measure of breadth (NO3USPC). The estimated coe±cient is similar to the earlier estimate by Lanjouw and Schankerman and highly signi¯cant.
A ten percent increase in NO3USPC (the mean number of technology¯eld assignments is 2.2) reduces the litigation probability by about 1.7 percent. 17 This¯nding suggests that it is harder to detect infringements when the patented innovation is used in more technology areas, and that this e®ect dominates any increase in the number of potential infringers associated with greater patent breadth.
An important¯nding is that the probability of litigation is negatively related to the size of the patent portfolio, with an elasticity (at the mean) of -0.13. The marginal e®ect of portfolio size declines with larger portfolios (positive quadratic term), but the point estimate of the portfolio e®ect is negative over most of the sample range. This means that having a larger portfolio of patents reduces the probability of being involved in a suit on any individual patent owned by the¯rm { i.e., there are bene¯cial \enforcement spillovers" across patents within a given¯rm. We can compute by how much increasing portfolio size reduces the litigation probability of any constituent patent. For example, raising the portfolio from 100 to 500 patents lowers the litigation probability on an Additional evidence that the expectation of repeated interaction promotes settlement is provided by the technology concentration variable (C4), de¯ned in Section 3.
If a company operates in concentrated technology areas (i.e., where the top four¯rms account for a larger share of patenting), there is a greater chance the company will be involved in repeated patent disputes with the same¯rms. This should increase the likelihood of settlement and thus reduce the probability of litigation. As predicted, the coe±cient on the technology concentration index is negative and highly signi¯cant, and the quantitative e®ect on the litigation probability is large. A ten percent increase in the four-¯rm technology concentration index reduces the probability of a suit by 4.6 percent.
The portfolio size, company size and technology concentration variables capture the ability to trade and the role of repeated interaction. We also¯nd that the litigation probability is in°uenced by the asymmetry in portfolio size between the patent owner and likely disputants, which we interpret as re°ecting relative threat power of the parties.
The coe±cient on the relative size variable (Relsize) is signi¯cantly negative for infringement suits, as expected. 18 If a patent owner is large relative to typical disputants, the probability of litigation is lower (settlement is more likely). However, the e®ect is not very large { a ten percent increase in relative size lowers the litigation probability by 0.5 percent. Interestingly, relative size does not matter in declaratory judgment suits, those where the patent owner is the defendant (Panel B). The prediction was that larger relative size (of the patentee) would make settlement more di±cult or have no e®ect for declaratory judgement suits, and we¯nd the latter.
We easily reject the hypothesis that there are no ownership di®erences, when we the cost of litigation and access to information about potential infringements. We expect that the cost of litigating for domestic patentees is less than (or equal to) that for foreign patentees, and that it is harder for foreign owners to detect infringements in the U.S.
Given the cost of settling disputes, these hypotheses predict that domestic owners should litigate more often than their foreign counterparts. That is what we¯nd, except for listed companies. This exception is not surprising, since foreign¯rms that are listed, and with a presence, in the U.S. are less likely to be at much disadvantage in terms of litigation costs and access to information. Table 10 highlights the enormous heterogeneity in litigation risk implied by these estimation results. We calculate the population probability of involvement in an infringment suit for each patent in the matched sample, given the patent's full set of characteristics. The 50th-99th percentile cuto®s for the distribution of these probabilities is given in the¯rst row of the table. The probability of litigation for the median patent is just under one percent. However, among the top one percent of patents (99th percentile), the probability of involvement in a suit is over eight percent. The table shows that the rates can be far higher when the patents are segregated into di®erent is highly skewed { with most value attributable to the top patents { it is precisely the litigation risk in these top percentiles that is relevant for determining incentives.
We now turn to the econometric analysis of post-suit outcomes. In estimating these regressions, we do not control for selection { i.e., we do not use a (¯ling) selection equation together with the outcomes equation. Selection bias arises if there is signi¯cant covariance between the disturbances in the¯ling and outcome equations. We ask: given the selection that occurs at¯ling, is there any remaining association between patent and patentee characteristics and the outcomes? For purposes of assessing ex ante litigation risk (e.g., for patenting decisions or insurance pricing), this is the relevant question.
Controlling for selection in the analysis of outcomes (e.g., Somaya, 2001 ) is appropriate if one wanted to infer the e®ects of characteristics in a random sample at the outcomes stage. In any event, the evidence that there is any sample selection bias is mixed (Somaya 2001 ).
The non-parametric evidence presented in the previous section indicated that the main characteristics of patents and their owners do not a®ect the probability of settlement after a suit is¯led, nor the plainti® win rates for cases that reach trial. The probit regressions for settlement and win rates con¯rm this conclusion. For brevity we summarise the¯ndings but do not present the parameter estimates. The settlement regression has a meager pseudo-R 2 of 0.01. The null hypothesis that the regression as a whole is insigni¯cant is not rejected (Â 2 (29) = 39.7, p-value= 0.089). The only positivē nding is that the coe±cients on three technology¯eld dummies are signi¯cant and indicate that the settlement probability is about eight percentage points higher for patents in Electronics, Mechanical and Miscellaneous. 19 The probit regression for win rates has a pseudo-R 2 of 0.02. The whole regression is statistically insigni¯cant (Â 2 (28) = 19.7, pvalue= 0.90), as is each individual coe±cient. Based on our discussions with sta® at the Federal Judicial Center, there is no reason to believe that the data on settlements and plainti® win rates are systematically bad (these outcome data are recorded at di®erent times and in many di®erent courts). We are con¯dent that the \insigni¯cance" of these 19 It is also interesting to note that, if we restrict attention to suits where the original patentee is identi¯ed as the plainti®, then those suits involving smaller patentees (unlisted¯rms and domestic individuals) are signi¯cantly less likely to settle. These are patentees who do not have an exclusive licensee or late assignee litigating in their place. As plainti®s they are more likely to be inexperienced and more attached to their innovations than owners who have licensed or sold out. Both characteristics could impede settlement. regressions is meaningful: i.e., settlement and win rate outcomes are almost completely independent of observed characteristics of patents and their owners.
The probability that the settlement of infringement suits occurs early (before the pre-trial hearing) is also unrelated to most characteristics of the patent and its owner, with three noteworthy exceptions (the probit regression is signi¯cant: Â 2 (29) = 50.5, p-value= 0.008). First, early settlement is more likely if the patent in dispute is part of a larger portfolio (Portsize). A one standard deviation increase in portfolio size (1,300 patents) raises the probability of early settlement by about 12.9 percent. This is consistent with our earlier result that portfolio size makes¯ling a suit less likely in the¯rst place, due to greater ability to \trade" intellectual property. Second, a higher technology concentration index (C4) makes early settlement somewhat less likely. A one standard deviation increase (doubling) in the concentration index lowers the probability by about two percent. Finally, patent owners that are large relative to a representative disputant (Relsize) are also less likely to settle early. A one standard deviation rise in relative size reduces the probability of early settlement by about¯ve percent. 20 Recall that the probability that a suit is¯led is lower when the relative size of the patentee is larger, which we interpret as re°ecting greater threat power. But if the (implicit) threats do not succeed in preventing the need to¯le suit, it is important for the patentee to carry out those threats in order to maintain credibility (post-suit \toughness"). Similarly, it the discipline of repeated interaction has failed to keep¯rms in a concentrated area out of court in the¯rst place, the dispute is probably very intractable. Both could delay any post-suit settlement, and this is what we¯nd.
Concluding Remarks
We study the determinants of patent infringement and declaratory judgement suits, and their outcomes, by linking detailed information from the U.S. patent o±ce to data from the U.S. federal court system, the Derwent database and industry sources. This allows us to construct a suitable controlled random sample of the population of potential disputants. The data set we construct is the most comprehensive yet available, covering all patent suits in the U.S. reported by the federal courts during the period 1978-1999.
A major¯nding in the paper is that all of the sorting among patent disputes on 20 Marginal changes are given in terms of standard deviations here because the distribution of these variables is very skewed after the selection for¯ling. observable characteristics occurs in the decision to¯le suits. The key post-suit outcomes { the probability of settlement and plainti® win rates at trial { do not depend on these characteristics. From a policy perspective, this is good news because it means that enforcement of patent rights relies on the e®ective threat of court action (suits) more than on extensive post-suit, legal proceedings that consume court resources. This feature is reinforced by high post-suit settlement rates and the fact that most settlement occurs soon after the suit is¯led, often before the pre-trial hearing is held. These¯ndings mean that the enforcement of patent rights minimises the use of judicial resources for sorting out patent disputes. The bad news is that individuals and small companies are much more likely to be involved in suits, conditional on the characteristics of their patent, but An important direction for future research is to explore the dynamic aspects of con°ict between¯rms over intellectual property assets. This would include studying the determinants of the¯ling and outcomes of multiple (sequential) suits on the same patent with di®erent parties, and multiple suits on di®erent patents involving the same parties.
Initial work along these lines for a sample of cases is found in Somaya (2001) . Proceeding further requires matching the names of litigants across all cases, a project underway.
When completed these data will provide information about the role of reputation building in the area of patent enforcement and allow a more detailed assessment of litigation risk and its associated costs. Even without this information, however, the¯ndings in this paper can and should be exploited to develop economically rational pricing of litigation risk in insurance markets, and theoretical work may be useful in understanding how e®ective litigation insurance markets are likely to a®ect strategic interaction and R&D incentives among di®erent¯rms. . We cannot calculate these directly as N z;g is unobserved.
However, since the matched sample is random with respect to portfolio size, we can use the sample share of the patents in group g that are in portfolios of size z, c
an unbiased estimator of the population share
Using this, our estimator is:
Now, treating the population itself as a sample from an underlying distribution, Lz;g Ng will also be an estimate of an underlying probability, say p, with an associated sampling variance. Taking a Taylor expansion, we can capture both sources of error in the following approximation:
where the covariance terms are zero because the two sources of sampling error are independent. This simpli¯es to:
Filing probabilities at a more aggregated level are calculated as a weighted average of these rates, with weights based on M g :
Appendix 3. Deriving Population Litigation Probabilities and Marginal E®ects

Population Litigation Probabilities
We de¯ne classes by using characteristics with respect to which the sampling was non-random: USPC groups, cohort, infringement suits, and declaratory judgement suits.
Let P (X c ) denote the population probability of litigation for a patent in class c with a vector of other characteristics X c and let Q(X c ) be the corresponding probability in the pooled (litigated and matched) sample. P (X c ) and Q(X c ) di®er because the matched sample was constructed so that the overall litigation probability is¯fty percent, controlling for technology and cohort. We want to infer P (X c ) from the estimated value of Q(X c ):
First we determine the extent to which we must in°ate the matched sample for a given class to have it re°ect the number of unlitigated patents in that class in the population. Let Q and P represent the aggregate sample and population litigation probabilities for a given class:
where L and M denote the number of litigated and matched patents in the sample. The population probability is
The number of litigated patents is the same in both cases since the sample contains all (reported) litigated patents, and N is the number of unlitigated patents in the class in the population. Using these equations, we get
Within a class, the matched patents are random draws so the distribution of characteristics in the matched sample is the same as the population. Thus the expected number of matched patents with characteristics X c in the population, N (X c ), is greater than in the sample by the in°ation factor, K, and so equals KM(X c ). Letting L(X c ) be the number of litigated patents with characteristics X c , the expected population probability of litigation for such patents is
Solving for M and substituting we get the result:
Population Marginal E®ects
For each characteristic X k , the population marginal e®ect is
The last term is the sample marginal e®ect computed from the probit regression. From the expression for P (X c ) we get
Measuring Q(X c ) by the sample probability of litigation in the class, Q, we get the result:
We measure P for each class as follows: For the denominator, we take the total number of patents in the class during 1978-1995. In the numerator we use the number of infringement or declaratory judgement suits that can be directly identi¯ed as such and include all others as infringement suits. These are in°ated for underreporting and for truncation as described in Appendix 1. We then calculate marginal adjustment factors by USPC groups, infringement and declaratory judgement suits. Separate classes de¯ned by cohort are not needed because of the maintained hypothesis that the litigation model applies to all cohorts, making non-systematic sampling in this dimension unimportant.
Results are at the bottom of Table 9 . Because dP (X c )=dQ(X c ) is the same for all X k for a given class c; all sample marginal e®ects are adjusted by the same factor to convert them to population marginals. Numbers in bold are statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01 level. Notes: The probability of litigation is adjusted for underreporting and truncation and for the over-representation of patents from large portfolios (Appendix 2). See also notes to Table 4 . Notes: The probability of litigation is the number of patents involved in suits (multiple suits not counted) per hundred patents, adjusted for underreporting and truncation and for the over-representation of patents from large portfolios (Appendix 2). 'nc'
denotes an empty cell. See also notes to Table 4 . Notes: The timing of settlements is computed on the basis of all infringement cases led during the period 1978-1992 and terminated by settlement before or during trial, according to the FJC. Cases that proceed beyond trial (e.g., on appeal or remand, which are about 5%) are not included. The plainti® win rate is the number of infringement cases where the court judgement favors the patentee divided by the total number of cases.
When the FJC reports a judgement in favor of both parties, we treat it as a win for each party and adjust the total appropriately. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are based on the binomial formula. Numbers in bold are statistically signi¯cant at the 0.01 level. 
Notes:
The distribution of population probabilities for patents with di®erent characteristics is calculated by¯rst computing the sample probabilities using the parameter estimates for infringement suits in Table 9 . These are then adjusted to re°ect population probabilities using Appendix equation (A.3.1).
